Internal Discipline Case

1 G.R. No. L-17144            October 28, 1960 SERGIO OSMEÑA, JR., petitioner, vs. SALIPADA K. PENDATUN, LEON Z. GUINTO, JR., VICENTE L. PERALTA, FAUSTINO TOBIA, LORENZO G. TEVES, JOPSE J. ROY, FAUSTINO DUGENIO, ANTONIO Y. DE PIO, BENJAMIN T. LIGOT, PEDRO G. TRONO, FELIPE ABRIGO, FELIPE S. ABELEDA, TECLA SAN ANDRES ZIGA, ANGEL B. FERNADEZ, and EUGENIO S. BALTAO, in their capacity as members of the Special Committee created by House Resolution No. 59, respondents. BENGZON, J.: On July 14, 1960, Congressman Sergio Osmeña, Jr., submitted to this Court a verified petition for "declaratory relief, certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction" against Congressman Salapida K. Pendatun and fourteen other congressmen in their capacity as members of the Special Committee created by House Resolution No. 59. He asked for annulment of such Resolution on the ground of infringenment of his parliamentary immunity; he also asked, principally, that said members of the special committee be enjoined from proceeding in accordance with it, particularly the portion authorizing them to require him to substantiate his charges against the President with the admonition that if he failed to do so, he must show cause why the House should not punish him. The petition attached a copy of House Resolution No. 59, the pertinent portions of which reads as follows: WHEREAS, on the 23rd day of June, 1960 , the Honorable Sergio Osmeña, Jr., Member of the House of Representatives from the Second District of the province of Cebu, took the floor of this chamber on the one hour

privilege to deliver a speech, entitled 'A Message to Garcia; WHEREAS, in the course of said speech, the Congressman from the Second District of Cebu stated the following:. xxx           xxx           xxx The people, Mr. President, have been hearing of ugly reports that under your unpopular administration the free things they used to get from the government are now for sale at premium prices. They say that even pardons are for sale, and that regardless of the gravity or seriousness of a criminal case, the culprit can always be bailed out forever from jail as long as he can come across with a handsome dole. I am afraid, such an anomalous situation would reflect badly on the kind of justice that your administration is dispensing. . . . . WHEREAS, the charges of the gentleman from the Second District of Cebu, if made maliciously or recklessly and without basis in truth and in fact, would constitute a serious assault upon the dignity and prestige of the Office of 37 3 the President, which is the one visible symbol of the sovereignty of the Filipino people, and would expose said office to contempt and disrepute; . . . . Resolved by the House of Representative, that a special committee of fifteen Members to be appointed by the Speaker be, and the same hereby is, created to investigate the truth of the charges against the President of the Philippines made by Honorable Sergio Osmeña, Jr., in his privilege speech of June 223, 1960, and for such purpose it is authorized to summon Honorable Sergio Osmeña, jr., to appear before it to substantiate his charges, as well as to issue subpoena and/or subpoena

2 duces tecum to require the attendance of witnesses and/or the production of pertinent papers before it, and if Honorable Sergio Osmeña, Jr., fails to do so to require him to show cause why he should not be punished by the House. The special committee shall submit to the House a report of its findings and recommendations before the adjournment of the present special session of the Congress of the Philippines. In support of his request, Congressman Osmeña alleged; first, the Resolution violated his constitutional absolute parliamentary immunity for speeches delivered in the House; second, his words constituted no actionable conduct; and third, after his allegedly objectionable speech and words, the House took up other business, and Rule XVII, sec. 7 of the Rules of House provides that if other business has intervened after the member had uttered obnoxious words in debate, he shall not be held to answer therefor nor be subject to censure by the House. Although some members of the court expressed doubts of petitioner's cause of action and the Court's jurisdiction, the majority decided to hear the matter further, and required respondents to answer, without issuing any preliminary injunction. Evidently aware of such circumstance with its implications, and pressed for time in view of the imminent adjournment of the legislative session, the special committee continued to perform its talk, and after giving Congressman Osmeña a chance to defend himself, submitted its reports on July 18, 1960, finding said congressman guilty of serious disorderly behaviour; and acting on such report, the House approved on the same day—before closing its session—House Resolution No. 175, declaring him guilty as recommended, and suspending him from office for fifteen months. Thereafter, on July 19, 1960, the respondents (with the exception of Congressmen De Pio, Abeleda, San Andres Ziga, Fernandez and Balatao)1 filed their answer, challenged the jurisdiction of this Court to entertain the petition, defended the power of Congress to

discipline its members with suspension, upheld a House Resolution No. 175 and then invited attention to the fact that Congress having ended its session on July 18, 1960, the Committee—whose members are the sole respondents—had thereby ceased to exist. There is no question that Congressman Osmeña, in a privilege speech delivered before the House, made the serious imputations of bribery against the President which are quoted in Resolution No. 59 and that he refused to produce before the House Committee created for the purpose, evidence to substantiate such imputations. There is also no question that for having made the imputations and for failing to produce evidence in support thereof, he was, by resolution of the House, suspended from office for a period of fifteen months for serious disorderly behaviour. Resolution No. 175 states in part: WHEREAS, the Special Committee created under and by virtue of Resolution No. 59, adopted on July 8, 1960, found Representative Sergio Osmeña, Jr., guilty of serious disorderly behaviour for making without basis in truth and in fact, scurrilous, malicious, reckless and irresponsible charges against the President of the Philippines in his privilege speech of June 23, 1960; and WHEREAS, the said charges are so vile in character that they affronted and degraded the dignity of the House of Representative: Now, Therefore, be it RESOLVED by the House of Representatives. That Representative Sergio Osmeña, Jr., be, as he hereby is, declared guilty of serious disorderly behaviour; and . . . As previously stated, Osmeña contended in his petition that: (1) the Constitution gave him complete parliamentary immunity, and

3 so, for words spoken in the House, he ought not to be questioned; (20 that his speech constituted no disorderly behaviour for which he could be punished; and (3) supposing he could be questioned and discipline therefor, the House had lost the power to do so because it had taken up other business before approving House Resolution No. 59. Now, he takes the additional position (4) that the House has no power, under the Constitution, to suspend one of its members. Section 15, Article VI of our Constitution provides that "for any speech or debate" in Congress, the Senators or Members of the House of Representative "shall not be questioned in any other place." This section was taken or is a copy of sec. 6, clause 1 of Art. 1 of the Constitution of the United States. In that country, the provision has always been understood to mean that although exempt from prosecution or civil actions for their words uttered in Congress, the members of Congress may, nevertheless, be questioned in Congress itself. Observe that "they shall not be questioned in any other place" than Congress. Furthermore, the Rules of the House which petitioner himself has invoked (Rule XVII, sec. 7), recognize the House's power to hold a member responsible "for words spoken in debate." Our Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity which is a fundamental privilege cherished in every legislative assembly of the democratic world. As old as the English Parliament, its purpose "is to enable and encourage a representative of the public to discharge his public trust with firmness and success" for "it is indispensably necessary that he should enjoy the fullest liberty of speech, and that he should be protected from the resentment of every one, however powerful, to whom exercise of that liberty may occasion offense."2 Such immunity has come to this country from the practices of Parliamentary as construed and applied by the Congress of the United States. Its extent and application remain no longer in doubt in so far as related to the question before us. It guarantees the legislator complete freedom of expression without fear of being made responsible in criminal

or civil actions before the courts or any other forum outside of the Congressional Hall. But is does not protect him from responsibility before the legislative body itself whenever his words and conduct are considered by the latter disorderly or unbecoming a member thereof. In the United States Congress, Congressman Fernando Wood of New York was censured for using the following language on the floor of the House: "A monstrosity, a measure the most infamous of the many infamous acts of the infamous Congress." (Hinds' Precedents, Vol. 2,. pp. 798-799). Two other congressmen were censured for employing insulting words during debate. (2 Hinds' Precedents, 799-801). In one case, a member of Congress was summoned to testify on a statement made by him in debate, but invoked his parliamentary privilege. The Committee rejected his plea. (3 Hinds' Precedents 123-124.) For unparliamentary conduct, members of Parliament or of Congress have been, or could be censured, committed to prison3, even expelled by the votes of their colleagues. The appendix to this decision amply attest to the consensus of informed opinion regarding the practice and the traditional power of legislative assemblies to take disciplinary action against its members, including imprisonment, suspension or expulsion. It mentions one instance of suspension of a legislator in a foreign country. And to cite a local illustration, the Philippine Senate, in April 1949, suspended a senator for one year. Needless to add, the Rules of Philippine House of Representatives provide that the parliamentary practices of the Congress of the United States shall apply in a supplementary manner to its proceedings. This brings up the third point of petitioner: the House may no longer take action against me, he argues, because after my speech, and before approving Resolution No. 59, it had taken up other business. Respondents answer that Resolution No. 59 was unanimously approved by the House, that such approval

4 amounted to a suspension of the House Rules, which according to standard parliamentary practice may done by unanimous consent. Granted, counters the petitioner, that the House may suspended the operation of its Rules, it may not, however, affect past acts or renew its rights to take action which had already lapsed. The situation might thus be compared to laws4 extending the period of limitation of actions and making them applicable to actions that had lapsed. The Supreme Court of the United States has upheld such laws as against the contention that they impaired vested rights in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment (Campbell vs. Holt, 115 U. S. 620). The states hold divergent views. At any rate, court are subject to revocation modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them."5 And it has been said that "Parliamentary rules are merely procedural, and with their observancem, the courts have no concern. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body." Consequently, "mere failure to conform to parliamentary usage will not invalidate the action (taken by a deliberative body) when the requisited number of members have agreed to a particular measure."6 The following is quoted from a reported decision of the Supreme court of Tennessee: The rule here invoked is one of parliamentary procedure, and it is uniformly held that it is within the power of all deliberative bodies to abolish, modify, or waive their own rules of procedure, adopted for the orderly con duct of business, and as security against hasty action. (Bennet vs. New Bedford, 110 Mass, 433; Holt vs. Somerville, 127 Mass. 408, 411; City of Sadalia vs. Scott, 104 Mo. App. 595, 78 S. W. 276; Ex parte Mayor, etc., of Albany, 23 Wend. [N. Y.] 277, 280; Wheelock vs. City of Lowell, 196 Mass. 220, 230. 81 N. e. 977, 124 Am. St. Rep. 543, 12 Ann. Cas. 1109; City of Corinth vs. Sharp, 107 Miss. 696, 65 So. 888;

McGraw vs. Whitson, 69 Iowa, 348, 28 N. W. 632; Tuell vs. Meacham Contracting Co. 145 Ky. 181, 186, 140 S. W. Ann. Cas. 1913B, 802.) [Takenfrom the case of Rutherford vs. City of Nashville, 78 south Western Reporter, p. 584.] It may be noted in this connection, that in the case of Congressman Stanbery of Ohio, who insulted the Speaker, for which Act a resolution of censure was presented, the House approved the resolution, despite the argument that other business had intervened after the objectionable remarks. (2 Hinds' Precedents pp. 799-800.) On the question whether delivery of speeches attacking the Chief Executive constitutes disorderly conduct for which Osmeña may be discipline, many arguments pro and con have been advanced. We believe, however, that the House is the judge of what constitutes disorderly behaviour, not only because the Constitution has conferred jurisdiction upon it, but also because the matter depends mainly on factual circumstances of which the House knows best but which can not be depicted in black and white for presentation to, and adjudication by the Courts. For one thing, if this Court assumed the power to determine whether Osmeña conduct constituted disorderly behaviour, it would thereby have assumed appellate jurisdiction, which the Constitution never intended to confer upon a coordinate branch of the Government. The theory of separation of powers fastidiously observed by this Court, demands in such situation a prudent refusal to interfere. Each department, it has been said, had exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction and is supreme within its own sphere. (Angara vs. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil., 139.) SEC. 200. Judicial Interference with Legislature. — The principle is well established that the courts will not assume a jurisdiction in any case amount to an interference by the judicial department with the legislature

5 since each department is equally independent within the power conferred upon it by the Constitution. . . . . The general rule has been applied in other cases to cause the courts to refuse to intervene in what are exclusively legislative functions. Thus, where the stated Senate is given the power to example a member, the court will not review its action or revise even a most arbitrary or unfair decision. (11 Am. Jur., Const. Law, sec. p. 902.) [Emphasis Ours.]. The above statement of American law merely abridged the landmark case of Clifford vs. French.7 In 1905, several senators who had been expelled by the State Senate of California for having taken a bribe, filed mandamus proceeding to compel reinstatement, alleging the Senate had given them no hearing, nor a chance to make defense, besides falsity of the charges of bribery. The Supreme Court of California declined to interfere , explaining in orthodox juristic language: Under our form of government, the judicial department has no power to revise even the most arbitrary and unfair action of the legislative department, or of either house thereof, taking in pursuance of the power committed exclusively to that department by the Constitution. It has been held by high authority that, even in the absence of an express provision conferring the power, every legislative body in which is vested the general legislative power of the state has the implied power to expel a member for any cause which it may deem sufficient. In Hiss. vs. Barlett, 3 Gray 473, 63 Am. Dec. 768, the supreme court of Mass. says, in substance, that this power is inherent in every legislative body; that it is necessary to the to enable the body 'to perform its high functions, and is necessary to the safety of the state;' 'That it is a power of self-protection, and that the legislative body must necessarily be the sole judge of the exigency which may justify and require its exercise. '. . .

There is no provision authority courts to control, direct, supervise, or forbid the exercise by either house of the power to expel a member. These powers are functions of the legislative department and therefore, in the exercise of the power this committed to it, the senate is supreme. An attempt by this court to direct or control the legislature, or either house thereof, in the exercise of the power, would be an attempt to exercise legislative functions, which it is expressly forbidden to do. We have underscored in the above quotation those lines which in our opinion emphasize the principles controlling this litigation. Although referring to expulsion, they may as well be applied to other disciplinary action. Their gist as applied to the case at bar: the House has exclusive power; the courts have no jurisdiction to interfere. Our refusal to intervene might impress some readers as subconscious hesitation due to discovery of impermissible course of action in the legislative chamber. Nothing of that sort: we merely refuse to disregard the allocation of constitutional functions which it is our special duty to maintain. Indeed, in the interest of comity, we feel bound to state that in a conscientious survey of governing principles and/or episodic illustrations, we found the House of Representatives of the United States taking the position upon at least two occasions, that personal attacks upon the Chief Executive constitute unparliamentary conduct or breach of orders.8 And in several instances, it took action against offenders, even after other business had been considered.9 Petitioner's principal argument against the House's power to suspend is the Alejandrino precedent. In 1924, Senator Alejandrino was, by resolution of Senate, suspended from office for 12 months because he had assaulted another member of the that Body or certain phrases the latter had uttered in the course of a debate. The Senator applied to this Court for reinstatement, challenging the validity of the resolution. Although this Court held that in view of the separation of powers, it had no jurisdiction to

6 compel the Senate to reinstate petitioner, it nevertheless went on to say the Senate had no power to adopt the resolution because suspension for 12 months amounted to removal, and the Jones Law (under which the Senate was then functioning) gave the Senate no power to remove an appointive member, like Senator Alejandrino. The Jones Law specifically provided that "each house may punish its members for disorderly behaviour, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds votes, expel an elective member (sec. 18). Note particularly the word "elective." The Jones Law, it mist be observed, empowered the Governor General to appoint "without consent of the Senate and without restriction as to residence senators . . . who will, in his opinion, best represent the Twelfth District." Alejandrino was one appointive Senator. It is true, the opinion in that case contained an obiter dictum that "suspension deprives the electoral district of representation without that district being afforded any means by which to fill that vacancy." But that remark should be understood to refer particularly to the appointive senator who was then the affected party and who was by the same Jones Law charged with the duty to represent the Twelfth District and maybe the view of the Government of the United States or of the Governor-General, who had appointed him. It must be observed, however, that at that time the Legislature had only those power which were granted to it by the Jones Law10; whereas now the Congress has the full legislative powers and preprogatives of a sovereign nation, except as restricted by the Constitution. In other words, in the Alejandrino case, the Court reached the conclusion that the Jones Law did not give the Senate the power it then exercised—the power of suspension for one year. Whereas now, as we find, the Congress has the inherent legislative prerogative of suspension11 which the Constitution did not impair. In fact, as already pointed out, the Philippine Senate suspended a Senator for 12 months in 1949.

The Legislative power of the Philippine Congress is plenary, subject only to such limitations are found in the Republic's Constitution. So that any power deemed to be legislative by usage or tradition, is necessarily possessed by the Philippine Congress, unless the Constitution provides otherwise. (Vera vs. Avelino, 77 Phil., 192, 212 .) In any event, petitioner's argument as to the deprivation of the district's representation can not be more weightly in the matter of suspension than in the case of imprisonment of a legislator; yet deliberative bodies have the power in proper cases, to commit one of their members to jail.12 Now come questions of procedure and jurisdiction. the petition intended to prevent the Special Committee from acting tin pursuance of House Resolution No. 59. Because no preliminary injunction had been issued, the Committee performed its task, reported to the House, and the latter approved the suspension order. The House had closed it session, and the Committee has ceased to exist as such. It would seem, therefore, the case should be dismissed for having become moot or academic.13 Of course, there is nothing to prevent petitioner from filing new pleadings to include all members of the House as respondents, ask for reinstatement and thereby to present a justiciable cause. Most probable outcome of such reformed suit, however, will be a pronouncement of lack of jurisdiction, as in Vera vs. Avelino14 and Alejandrino vs. Qeuaon.15 At any rate, having perceived suitable solutions to the important questions of political law, the Court thought it proper to express at this time its conclusions on such issues as were deemed relevant and decisive. ACCORDINGLY, the petition has to be, and is hereby dismissed. So ordered.

7 G.R. No. 175352               DANTE V. LIBAN, REYNALDO M. BERNARDO, and SALVADOR M. VIARI, Petitioners, vs. RICHARD J. GORDON, Respondent. DECISION CARPIO, J.: The Case This is a petition to declare Senator Richard J. Gordon (respondent) as having forfeited his seat in the Senate. The Facts Petitioners Dante V. Liban, Reynaldo M. Bernardo, and Salvador M. Viari (petitioners) filed with this Court a Petition to Declare Richard J. Gordon as Having Forfeited His Seat in the Senate. Petitioners are officers of the Board of Directors of the Quezon City Red Cross Chapter while respondent is Chairman of the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) Board of Governors. During respondent’s incumbency as a member of the Senate of the Philippines,1 he was elected Chairman of the PNRC during the 23 February 2006 meeting of the PNRC Board of Governors. Petitioners allege that by accepting the chairmanship of the PNRC Board of Governors, respondent has ceased to be a member of the Senate as provided in Section 13, Article VI of the Constitution, which reads: SEC. 13. No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may hold any other office or employment in the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their

subsidiaries, during his term without forfeiting his seat. Neither shall he be appointed to any office which may have been created or the emoluments thereof increased during the term for which he was elected. Petitioners cite Camporedondo v. NLRC,2 which held that the PNRC is a government-owned or controlled corporation. Petitioners claim that in accepting and holding the position of Chairman of the PNRC Board of Governors, respondent has automatically forfeited his seat in the Senate, pursuant to Flores v. Drilon,3 which held that incumbent national legislators lose their elective posts upon their appointment to another government office. In his Comment, respondent asserts that petitioners have no standing to file this petition which appears to be an action for quo warranto, since the petition alleges that respondent committed an act which, by provision of law, constitutes a ground for forfeiture of his public office. Petitioners do not claim to be entitled to the Senate office of respondent. Under Section 5, Rule 66 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, only a person claiming to be entitled to a public office usurped or unlawfully held by another may bring an action for quo warranto in his own name. If the petition is one for quo warranto, it is already barred by prescription since under Section 11, Rule 66 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the action should be commenced within one year after the cause of the public officer’s forfeiture of office. In this case, respondent has been working as a Red Cross volunteer for the past 40 years. Respondent was already Chairman of the PNRC Board of Governors when he was elected Senator in May 2004, having been elected Chairman in 2003 and re-elected in 2005. Respondent contends that even if the present petition is treated as a taxpayer’s suit, petitioners cannot be allowed to raise a constitutional question in the absence of any claim that they suffered some actual damage or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal act of respondent. Furthermore, taxpayers are allowed to sue only when there is a claim of illegal disbursement

8 of public funds, or that public money is being diverted to any improper purpose, or where petitioners seek to restrain respondent from enforcing an invalid law that results in wastage of public funds. Respondent also maintains that if the petition is treated as one for declaratory relief, this Court would have no jurisdiction since original jurisdiction for declaratory relief lies with the Regional Trial Court. Respondent further insists that the PNRC is not a governmentowned or controlled corporation and that the prohibition under Section 13, Article VI of the Constitution does not apply in the present case since volunteer service to the PNRC is neither an office nor an employment. In their Reply, petitioners claim that their petition is neither an action for quo warranto nor an action for declaratory relief. Petitioners maintain that the present petition is a taxpayer’s suit questioning the unlawful disbursement of funds, considering that respondent has been drawing his salaries and other compensation as a Senator even if he is no longer entitled to his office. Petitioners point out that this Court has jurisdiction over this petition since it involves a legal or constitutional issue which is of transcendental importance. The Issues Petitioners raise the following issues:

3. Whether respondent should be automatically removed as a Senator pursuant to Section 13, Article VI of the Philippine Constitution; and 4. Whether petitioners may legally institute this petition against respondent.4 The substantial issue boils down to whether the office of the PNRC Chairman is a government office or an office in a government-owned or controlled corporation for purposes of the prohibition in Section 13, Article VI of the Constitution. The Court’s Ruling We find the petition without merit. Petitioners Have No Standing to File this Petition A careful reading of the petition reveals that it is an action for quo warranto. Section 1, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court provides: Section 1. Action by Government against individuals. – An action for the usurpation of a public office, position or franchise may be commenced by a verified petition brought in the name of the Republic of the Philippines against: (a) A person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public office, position or franchise;

1. Whether the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) is a government- owned or controlled corporation;

(b) A public officer who does or suffers an act which by provision of law, constitutes a ground for the forfeiture of his office; or

2. Whether Section 13, Article VI of the Philippine Constitution applies to the case of respondent who is Chairman of the PNRC and at the same time a Member of the Senate;

(c) An association which acts as a corporation within the Philippines without being legally incorporated or without lawful authority so to act. (Emphasis supplied)

9 Petitioners allege in their petition that: 4. Respondent became the Chairman of the PNRC when he was elected as such during the First Regular Luncheon-Meeting of the Board of Governors of the PNRC held on February 23, 2006, the minutes of which is hereto attached and made integral part hereof as Annex "A." 5. Respondent was elected as Chairman of the PNRC Board of Governors, during his incumbency as a Member of the House of Senate of the Congress of the Philippines, having been elected as such during the national elections last May 2004. 6. Since his election as Chairman of the PNRC Board of Governors, which position he duly accepted, respondent has been exercising the powers and discharging the functions and duties of said office, despite the fact that he is still a senator. 7. It is the respectful submission of the petitioner[s] that by accepting the chairmanship of the Board of Governors of the PNRC, respondent has ceased to be a Member of the House of Senate as provided in Section 13, Article VI of the Philippine Constitution, x x x xxxx 10. It is respectfully submitted that in accepting the position of Chairman of the Board of Governors of the PNRC on February 23, 2006, respondent has automatically forfeited his seat in the House of Senate and, therefore, has long ceased to be a Senator, pursuant to the ruling of this Honorable Court in the case of FLORES, ET AL. VS. DRILON AND GORDON, G.R. No. 104732, x x x

11. Despite the fact that he is no longer a senator, respondent continues to act as such and still performs the powers, functions and duties of a senator, contrary to the constitution, law and jurisprudence. 12. Unless restrained, therefore, respondent will continue to falsely act and represent himself as a senator or member of the House of Senate, collecting the salaries, emoluments and other compensations, benefits and privileges appertaining and due only to the legitimate senators, to the damage, great and irreparable injury of the Government and the Filipino people.5 (Emphasis supplied) Thus, petitioners are alleging that by accepting the position of Chairman of the PNRC Board of Governors, respondent has automatically forfeited his seat in the Senate. In short, petitioners filed an action for usurpation of public office against respondent, a public officer who allegedly committed an act which constitutes a ground for the forfeiture of his public office. Clearly, such an action is for quo warranto, specifically under Section 1(b), Rule 66 of the Rules of Court. Quo warranto is generally commenced by the Government as the proper party plaintiff. However, under Section 5, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court, an individual may commence such an action if he claims to be entitled to the public office allegedly usurped by another, in which case he can bring the action in his own name. The person instituting quo warranto proceedings in his own behalf must claim and be able to show that he is entitled to the office in dispute, otherwise the action may be dismissed at any stage.6 In the present case, petitioners do not claim to be entitled to the Senate office of respondent. Clearly, petitioners have no standing to file the present petition. Even if the Court disregards the infirmities of the petition and treats it as a taxpayer’s suit, the petition would still fail on the merits.

10 PNRC is a Private Organization Performing Public Functions On 22 March 1947, President Manuel A. Roxas signed Republic Act No. 95,7 otherwise known as the PNRC Charter. The PNRC is a non-profit, donor-funded, voluntary, humanitarian organization, whose mission is to bring timely, effective, and compassionate humanitarian assistance for the most vulnerable without consideration of nationality, race, religion, gender, social status, or political affiliation.8 The PNRC provides six major services: Blood Services, Disaster Management, Safety Services, Community Health and Nursing, Social Services and Voluntary Service.9 The Republic of the Philippines, adhering to the Geneva Conventions, established the PNRC as a voluntary organization for the purpose contemplated in the Geneva Convention of 27 July 1929.10 The Whereas clauses of the PNRC Charter read: WHEREAS, there was developed at Geneva, Switzerland, on August 22, 1864, a convention by which the nations of the world were invited to join together in diminishing, so far lies within their power, the evils inherent in war; WHEREAS, more than sixty nations of the world have ratified or adhered to the subsequent revision of said convention, namely the "Convention of Geneva of July 29 [sic], 1929 for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick of Armies in the Field" (referred to in this Charter as the Geneva Red Cross Convention); WHEREAS, the Geneva Red Cross Convention envisages the establishment in each country of a voluntary organization to assist in caring for the wounded and sick of the armed forces and to furnish supplies for that purpose; WHEREAS, the Republic of the Philippines became an independent nation on July 4, 1946 and proclaimed its adherence

to the Geneva Red Cross Convention on February 14, 1947, and by that action indicated its desire to participate with the nations of the world in mitigating the suffering caused by war and to establish in the Philippines a voluntary organization for that purpose as contemplated by the Geneva Red Cross Convention; WHEREAS, there existed in the Philippines since 1917 a Charter of the American National Red Cross which must be terminated in view of the independence of the Philippines; and WHEREAS, the volunteer organizations established in the other countries which have ratified or adhered to the Geneva Red Cross Convention assist in promoting the health and welfare of their people in peace and in war, and through their mutual assistance and cooperation directly and through their international organizations promote better understanding and sympathy among the peoples of the world. (Emphasis supplied) The PNRC is a member National Society of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement (Movement), which is composed of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (International Federation), and the National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (National Societies). The Movement is united and guided by its seven Fundamental Principles: 1. HUMANITY – The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, born of a desire to bring assistance without discrimination to the wounded on the battlefield, endeavors, in its international and national capacity, to prevent and alleviate human suffering wherever it may be found. Its purpose is to protect life and health and to ensure respect for the human being. It promotes mutual understanding, friendship, cooperation and lasting peace amongst all peoples.

11 2. IMPARTIALITY – It makes no discrimination as to nationality, race, religious beliefs, class or political opinions. It endeavors to relieve the suffering of individuals, being guided solely by their needs, and to give priority to the most urgent cases of distress. 3. NEUTRALITY – In order to continue to enjoy the confidence of all, the Movement may not take sides in hostilities or engage at any time in controversies of a political, racial, religious or ideological nature. 4. INDEPENDENCE – The Movement is independent. The National Societies, while auxiliaries in the humanitarian services of their governments and subject to the laws of their respective countries, must always maintain their autonomy so that they may be able at all times to act in accordance with the principles of the Movement. 5. VOLUNTARY SERVICE – It is a voluntary relief movement not prompted in any manner by desire for gain. 6. UNITY – There can be only one Red Cross or one Red Crescent Society in any one country. It must be open to all. It must carry on its humanitarian work throughout its territory. 7. UNIVERSALITY – The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, in which all Societies have equal status and share equal responsibilities and duties in helping each other, is worldwide. (Emphasis supplied) The Fundamental Principles provide a universal standard of reference for all members of the Movement. The PNRC, as a member National Society of the Movement, has the duty to uphold the Fundamental Principles and ideals of the Movement. In order to be recognized as a National Society, the PNRC has to

be autonomous and must operate in conformity with the Fundamental Principles of the Movement.11 The reason for this autonomy is fundamental. To be accepted by warring belligerents as neutral workers during international or internal armed conflicts, the PNRC volunteers must not be seen as belonging to any side of the armed conflict. In the Philippines where there is a communist insurgency and a Muslim separatist rebellion, the PNRC cannot be seen as government-owned or controlled, and neither can the PNRC volunteers be identified as government personnel or as instruments of government policy. Otherwise, the insurgents or separatists will treat PNRC volunteers as enemies when the volunteers tend to the wounded in the battlefield or the displaced civilians in conflict areas. Thus, the PNRC must not only be, but must also be seen to be, autonomous, neutral and independent in order to conduct its activities in accordance with the Fundamental Principles. The PNRC must not appear to be an instrument or agency that implements government policy; otherwise, it cannot merit the trust of all and cannot effectively carry out its mission as a National Red Cross Society.12 It is imperative that the PNRC must be autonomous, neutral, and independent in relation to the State. To ensure and maintain its autonomy, neutrality, and independence, the PNRC cannot be owned or controlled by the government. Indeed, the Philippine government does not own the PNRC. The PNRC does not have government assets and does not receive any appropriation from the Philippine Congress.13 The PNRC is financed primarily by contributions from private individuals and private entities obtained through solicitation campaigns organized by its Board of Governors, as provided under Section 11 of the PNRC Charter: SECTION 11. As a national voluntary organization, the Philippine National Red Cross shall be financed primarily by contributions obtained through solicitation campaigns throughout the year which shall be organized by the Board of Governors and

12 conducted by the Chapters in their respective jurisdictions. These fund raising campaigns shall be conducted independently of other fund drives by other organizations. (Emphasis supplied) The government does not control the PNRC. Under the PNRC Charter, as amended, only six of the thirty members of the PNRC Board of Governors are appointed by the President of the Philippines. Thus, twenty-four members, or four-fifths (4/5), of the PNRC Board of Governors are not appointed by the President. Section 6 of the PNRC Charter, as amended, provides: SECTION 6. The governing powers and authority shall be vested in a Board of Governors composed of thirty members, six of whom shall be appointed by the President of the Philippines, eighteen shall be elected by chapter delegates in biennial conventions and the remaining six shall be selected by the twenty-four members of the Board already chosen. x x x. Thus, of the twenty-four members of the PNRC Board, eighteen are elected by the chapter delegates of the PNRC, and six are elected by the twenty-four members already chosen — a select group where the private sector members have three-fourths majority. Clearly, an overwhelming majority of four-fifths of the PNRC Board are elected or chosen by the private sector members of the PNRC.

whose appointments are vested in the President by the Constitution or by law. The President also appoints those whose appointments are not otherwise provided by law. Under this Section 16, the law may also authorize the "heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards" to appoint officers lower in rank than such heads of departments, agencies, commissions or boards.15 In Rufino v. Endriga,16 the Court explained appointments under Section 16 in this wise: Under Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, the President appoints three groups of officers. The first group refers to the heads of the Executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in the President by the Constitution. The second group refers to those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint. The third group refers to all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided by law. Under the same Section 16, there is a fourth group of lowerranked officers whose appointments Congress may by law vest in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards. x x x xxx

The PNRC Board of Governors, which exercises all corporate powers of the PNRC, elects the PNRC Chairman and all other officers of the PNRC. The incumbent Chairman of PNRC, respondent Senator Gordon, was elected, as all PNRC Chairmen are elected, by a private sector-controlled PNRC Board four-fifths of whom are private sector members of the PNRC. The PNRC Chairman is not appointed by the President or by any subordinate government official. Under Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution,14 the President appoints all officials and employees in the Executive branch

In a department in the Executive branch, the head is the Secretary. The law may not authorize the Undersecretary, acting as such Undersecretary, to appoint lower-ranked officers in the Executive department. In an agency, the power is vested in the head of the agency for it would be preposterous to vest it in the agency itself. In a commission, the head is the chairperson of the commission. In a board, the head is also the chairperson of the board. In the last three situations, the law may not also authorize officers other than the heads of the agency, commission, or board to appoint lower-ranked officers.

13 xxx The Constitution authorizes Congress to vest the power to appoint lower-ranked officers specifically in the "heads" of the specified offices, and in no other person. The word "heads" refers to the chairpersons of the commissions or boards and not to their members, for several reasons. The President does not appoint the Chairman of the PNRC. Neither does the head of any department, agency, commission or board appoint the PNRC Chairman. Thus, the PNRC Chairman is not an official or employee of the Executive branch since his appointment does not fall under Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution. Certainly, the PNRC Chairman is not an official or employee of the Judiciary or Legislature. This leads us to the obvious conclusion that the PNRC Chairman is not an official or employee of the Philippine Government. Not being a government official or employee, the PNRC Chairman, as such, does not hold a government office or employment. Under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution,17 the President exercises control over all government offices in the Executive branch. If an office is legally not under the control of the President, then such office is not part of the Executive branch. In Rufino v. Endriga,18 the Court explained the President’s power of control over all government offices as follows: Every government office, entity, or agency must fall under the Executive, Legislative, or Judicial branches, or must belong to one of the independent constitutional bodies, or must be a quasijudicial body or local government unit. Otherwise, such government office, entity, or agency has no legal and constitutional basis for its existence. The CCP does not fall under the Legislative or Judicial branches of government. The CCP is also not one of the independent

constitutional bodies. Neither is the CCP a quasi-judicial body nor a local government unit. Thus, the CCP must fall under the Executive branch. Under the Revised Administrative Code of 1987, any agency "not placed by law or order creating them under any specific department" falls "under the Office of the President." Since the President exercises control over "all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices," the President necessarily exercises control over the CCP which is an office in the Executive branch. In mandating that the President "shall have control of all executive . . . offices," Section 17, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution does not exempt any executive office — one performing executive functions outside of the independent constitutional bodies — from the President’s power of control. There is no dispute that the CCP performs executive, and not legislative, judicial, or quasi-judicial functions. The President’s power of control applies to the acts or decisions of all officers in the Executive branch. This is true whether such officers are appointed by the President or by heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards. The power of control means the power to revise or reverse the acts or decisions of a subordinate officer involving the exercise of discretion. In short, the President sits at the apex of the Executive branch, and exercises "control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices." There can be no instance under the Constitution where an officer of the Executive branch is outside the control of the President. The Executive branch is unitary since there is only one President vested with executive power exercising control over the entire Executive branch. Any office in the Executive branch that is not under the control of the President is a lost command whose existence is without any legal or constitutional basis. (Emphasis supplied)

14 An overwhelming four-fifths majority of the PNRC Board are private sector individuals elected to the PNRC Board by the private sector members of the PNRC. The PNRC Board exercises all corporate powers of the PNRC. The PNRC is controlled by private sector individuals. Decisions or actions of the PNRC Board are not reviewable by the President. The President cannot reverse or modify the decisions or actions of the PNRC Board. Neither can the President reverse or modify the decisions or actions of the PNRC Chairman. It is the PNRC Board that can review, reverse or modify the decisions or actions of the PNRC Chairman. This proves again that the office of the PNRC Chairman is a private office, not a government office. 1avvphi1

Although the State is often represented in the governing bodies of a National Society, this can be justified by the need for proper coordination with the public authorities, and the government representatives may take part in decision-making within a National Society. However, the freely-elected representatives of a National Society’s active members must remain in a large majority in a National Society’s governing bodies.19 The PNRC is not government-owned but privately owned. The vast majority of the thousands of PNRC members are private individuals, including students. Under the PNRC Charter, those who contribute to the annual fund campaign of the PNRC are entitled to membership in the PNRC for one year. Thus, any one between 6 and 65 years of age can be a PNRC member for one year upon contributing ₱35, ₱100, ₱300, ₱500 or ₱1,000 for the year.20 Even foreigners, whether residents or not, can be members of the PNRC. Section 5 of the PNRC Charter, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1264,21 reads: SEC. 5. Membership in the Philippine National Red Cross shall be open to the entire population in the Philippines regardless of citizenship. Any contribution to the Philippine National Red Cross Annual Fund Campaign shall entitle the contributor to membership for one year and said contribution shall be deductible in full for taxation purposes.

Thus, the PNRC is a privately owned, privately funded, and privately run charitable organization. The PNRC is not a government-owned or controlled corporation. Petitioners anchor their petition on the 1999 case of Camporedondo v. NLRC,22 which ruled that the PNRC is a government-owned or controlled corporation. In ruling that the PNRC is a government-owned or controlled corporation, the simple test used was whether the corporation was created by its own special charter for the exercise of a public function or by incorporation under the general corporation law. Since the PNRC was created under a special charter, the Court then ruled that it is a government corporation. However, the Camporedondo ruling failed to consider the definition of a government-owned or controlled corporation as provided under Section 2(13) of the Introductory Provisions of the Administrative Code of 1987: SEC. 2. General Terms Defined. – x x x (13) Government-owned or controlled corporation refers to any agency organized as a stock or non-stock corporation, vested with functions relating to public needs whether governmental or proprietary in nature, and owned by the Government directly or through its instrumentalities either wholly, or where applicable as in the case of stock corporations, to the extent of at least fifty-one (51) percent of its capital stock: Provided, That governmentowned or controlled corporations may be further categorized by the Department of the Budget, the Civil Service Commission, and the Commission on Audit for purposes of the exercise and discharge of their respective powers, functions and responsibilities with respect to such corporations.(Boldfacing and underscoring supplied) A government-owned or controlled corporation must be owned by the government, and in the case of a stock corporation, at least a majority of its capital stock must be owned by the government. In the case of a non-stock corporation, by analogy at least a majority of the members must be government officials holding such

15 membership by appointment or designation by the government. Under this criterion, and as discussed earlier, the government does not own or control PNRC. The PNRC Charter is Violative of the Constitutional Proscription against the Creation of Private Corporations by Special Law The 1935 Constitution, as amended, was in force when the PNRC was created by special charter on 22 March 1947. Section 7, Article XIV of the 1935 Constitution, as amended, reads: SEC. 7. The Congress shall not, except by general law, provide for the formation, organization, or regulation of private corporations, unless such corporations are owned or controlled by the Government or any subdivision or instrumentality thereof. The subsequent 1973 and 1987 Constitutions contain similar provisions prohibiting Congress from creating private corporations except by general law. Section 1 of the PNRC Charter, as amended, creates the PNRC as a "body corporate and politic," thus: SECTION 1. There is hereby created in the Republic of the Philippines a body corporate and politic to be the voluntary organization officially designated to assist the Republic of the Philippines in discharging the obligations set forth in the Geneva Conventions and to perform such other duties as are inherent upon a National Red Cross Society. The national headquarters of this Corporation shall be located in Metropolitan Manila. (Emphasis supplied)

corporations. The first refers to private corporations created under a general law. The second refers to government-owned or controlled corporations created by special charters. Section 16, Article XII of the Constitution provides: Sec. 16. The Congress shall not, except by general law, provide for the formation, organization, or regulation of private corporations. Government-owned or controlled corporations may be created or established by special charters in the interest of the common good and subject to the test of economic viability. The Constitution emphatically prohibits the creation of private corporations except by general law applicable to all citizens. The purpose of this constitutional provision is to ban private corporations created by special charters, which historically gave certain individuals, families or groups special privileges denied to other citizens. In short, Congress cannot enact a law creating a private corporation with a special charter. Such legislation would be unconstitutional. Private corporations may exist only under a general law. If the corporation is private, it must necessarily exist under a general law. Stated differently, only corporations created under a general law can qualify as private corporations. Under existing laws, the general law is the Corporation Code, except that the Cooperative Code governs the incorporation of cooperatives.

In Feliciano v. Commission on Audit,23 the Court explained the constitutional provision prohibiting Congress from creating private corporations in this wise:

The Constitution authorizes Congress to create governmentowned or controlled corporations through special charters. Since private corporations cannot have special charters, it follows that Congress can create corporations with special charters only if such corporations are government-owned or controlled.24 (Emphasis supplied)

We begin by explaining the general framework under the fundamental law. The Constitution recognizes two classes of

In Feliciano, the Court held that the Local Water Districts are government-owned or controlled corporations since they exist by

16 virtue of Presidential Decree No. 198, which constitutes their special charter. The seed capital assets of the Local Water Districts, such as waterworks and sewerage facilities, were public property which were managed, operated by or under the control of the city, municipality or province before the assets were transferred to the Local Water Districts. The Local Water Districts also receive subsidies and loans from the Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA). In fact, under the 2009 General Appropriations Act,25 the LWUA has a budget amounting to ₱400,000,000 for its subsidy requirements.26 There is no private capital invested in the Local Water Districts. The capital assets and operating funds of the Local Water Districts all come from the government, either through transfer of assets, loans, subsidies or the income from such assets or funds. The government also controls the Local Water Districts because the municipal or city mayor, or the provincial governor, appoints all the board directors of the Local Water Districts. Furthermore, the board directors and other personnel of the Local Water Districts are government employees subject to civil service laws and anti-graft laws. Clearly, the Local Water Districts are considered government-owned or controlled corporations not only because of their creation by special charter but also because the government in fact owns and controls the Local Water Districts. Just like the Local Water Districts, the PNRC was created through a special charter. However, unlike the Local Water Districts, the elements of government ownership and control are clearly lacking in the PNRC. Thus, although the PNRC is created by a special charter, it cannot be considered a government-owned or controlled corporation in the absence of the essential elements of ownership and control by the government. In creating the PNRC as a corporate entity, Congress was in fact creating a private corporation. However, the constitutional prohibition against the creation of private corporations by special charters provides no exception even for non-profit or charitable corporations. Consequently, the PNRC Charter, insofar as it creates the PNRC as a private corporation and grants it corporate powers,27 is void

for being unconstitutional. Thus, Sections 1,28 2,29 3,30 4(a),31 5,32 6,33 7,34 8,35 9,36 10,37 11,38 12,39 and 1340 of the PNRC Charter, as amended, are void. The other provisions41 of the PNRC Charter remain valid as they can be considered as a recognition by the State that the unincorporated PNRC is the local National Society of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, and thus entitled to the benefits, exemptions and privileges set forth in the PNRC Charter. The other provisions of the PNRC Charter implement the Philippine Government’s treaty obligations under Article 4(5) of the Statutes of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, which provides that to be recognized as a National Society, the Society must be "duly recognized by the legal government of its country on the basis of the Geneva Conventions and of the national legislation as a voluntary aid society, auxiliary to the public authorities in the humanitarian field." In sum, we hold that the office of the PNRC Chairman is not a government office or an office in a government-owned or controlled corporation for purposes of the prohibition in Section 13, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. However, since the PNRC Charter is void insofar as it creates the PNRC as a private corporation, the PNRC should incorporate under the Corporation Code and register with the Securities and Exchange Commission if it wants to be a private corporation. WHEREFORE, we declare that the office of the Chairman of the Philippine National Red Cross is not a government office or an office in a government-owned or controlled corporation for purposes of the prohibition in Section 13, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. We also declare that Sections 1, 2, 3, 4(a), 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, and 13 of the Charter of the Philippine National Red Cross, or Republic Act No. 95, as amended by Presidential Decree Nos. 1264 and 1643, are VOID because they create the PNRC as a private corporation or grant it corporate powers.